safety of other threatened positions."[1] The project was therefore dropped, and no further attempt was made during the ensuing autumn and winter to interfere with the uninterrupted development of the Federal army at and near Washington in organization and efficiency.

This scheme of invading the North in the autumn of 1861, although it never took shape, may well justify a few moments' consideration. It is altogether probable that the Confederate army was at that time decidedly the superior of its antagonist in many important respects. It had the prestige of victory. It had the self-confidence and audacity which the unfortunate panic, which overtook their foes after the battle of Manassas was over, could hardly fail to produce in the minds of the victors. It trusted its generals fully,—it believed in them enthusiastically. It was the only army in the country on either side that had won a considerable battle. It was the envy and pride of the Confederate soldiery. It cannot be doubted for a moment that regiments stationed at Charleston or Pensacola would have responded with the utmost alacrity to an order to join themselves to the victorious forces of Johnston and Beauregard,— would gladly have exchanged the tedium of garrison life for the excitement of an active

campaign. Had President Davis adopted the recommendations of his generals, and increased the Manassas army to 60,000 men, Johnston would have entered Maryland with a force considerably larger, and vastly more fresh and vigorous, than that with which General Lee the

*i R. &F., 449.